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Yet, nuclear deterrence of the Cold War, East-West variety depicts just such a scenario. If the United States attacked the Soviet Union, the Soviets' secure second-strike force would retaliate, and vice versa. Morgan, therefore, points out the contradiction between a state's effort to establish controlled and deliberate decision-making versus the necessity of projecting the seemingly irrational capability of launching, and subsequently suffering, a nuclear attack. Couched in the language of game theory, Zagare has made the argument that 'Prisoner's Dilemma' and 'Called Bluff' more accurately describe superpower deterrence behavior than a zero-sum version of 'Chicken', the game most often used to depict the dynamics nuclear deterrence.

However, mutual non-cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma is 2,2 , the second worst outcome, and therefore a credible deterrent strategy. In this case, being hit unilaterally is perceived as worse than an exchange. Nuclear 'optimists' believe the potential destruction resulting from a nuclear attack will prevent such an occurrence, even accidentally. Smoke defined escalation as "the process by which the previous limits of a war are crossed and new one established" and "limits of a war are the barriers or thresholds or stages of the escalation process". Kahn places the 'threshold' for nuclear use at the 21st rung, an "exemplary" local nuclear war in the category of "bizarre crises".

Or one of the antagonists may make military or political use of a nuclear weapon but try to give the impression that the use was unintentional". Most states could not progress that far, due to a more limited nuclear capability. Mini-arsenals, for example, could expend their entire nuclear force in one or two strikes. Using the ladder metaphor, if a function of nuclear escalation is to probe the possibility of keeping a war limited while maintaining the threat of a general nuclear war, then clearly some nuclear-capable states would be restricted to shorter ladders.

Freedman points out that Kahn's ladder provides a particularly significant prediction. Nuclear use is possible under controlled and rational decision-making. Even seemingly irrational acts are performed for rational purposes. The actor either more able, or more willing, to move up the ladder would have increased bargaining power. Waltz, an optimist, lists three requirements for successful deterrence by "small nuclear forces": 1 a secure second strike capability without 2 the necessity for early firing in response to a false alarm and 3 reliable command and control to avoid accidents or unauthorized launches. There still exists, however, the assumption not stated by Waltz as a requirement to inflict unacceptable damage.

Current studies rarely make this distinction, and therefore do not offer evidence to support Waltz's argument. Sagan, using organization theory, argues that weaknesses exist that may result in unreliable command and control. Israel did just that in when they bombed Iraq's Osiraq reactor before it could produce weapons-grade fissile material in sufficient amounts to allow the Iraqis to proliferate. In , a Joint Chiefs of Staff report to President Eisenhower advocated a preventive war against the USSR before they had achieved the ability to launch a massive strike against the US, 42 a capability they reached in In other instances, leadership may not respond the way the American president did at that time.

Hawks resemble nuclear optimists. They believe a state should bargain from strength, showing a firm resolve to use a nuclear deterrent. Doves manifest some aspects of pessimists, in that they fear arms races may actually weaken deterrence and advocate a policy of accommodation. They differ from many pessimists in their assumption, shared with hawks, that there is a rational decision-making process. Owls represent the pessimist concern about the many factors that can impede rational decision-making, such as poor information, errors, stress and organizational biases. However, the discussion, published in , relates to super-arsenal, Cold War states.

Nuclear use through rational decision-making can occur under other circumstances. A state may take nuclear chances by, in a sense, playing the odds. This tactic obviously benefits a non-status quo state, since a state predicted to accept the current situation rather than suffer loss would be more likely to succumb to nuclear intimidation. This argument, however convincing, matches many others, in that a distinction among levels of nuclear capability is not made clear. Deterrence theory, if it truly does function in the ways described above, possesses neorealist attributes of international relations. To determine costs, some kind of assessment needs to be made about an opponent's potential projection of power.

This model suggests that 'bean counting' should become the hallmark of determining relative power, which logically includes knowledge of the kinds and amounts of weapons and delivery systems within a nuclear force structure. Assuming the neorealist world of unitary, self-interested, power-maximizing states, the option to use nuclear weapons will be deterred if the costs of a second strike retaliation exceeds potential benefits.

In these situations, balance with high potential costs encourages stability, balance with low potential costs can be unstable, and imbalance alone is unstable, but particularly so when costs are low and preemption is attractive. The model's Trajectory 1 arrow 1 indicates low costs, but also may be interpreted as an area of possible conflict, or escalation to nuclear levels. As a state begins the initial move from 0,0 , it enters a "region of initiation". If this were compared to nuclear proliferation, Trajectory 1 depicts the earliest stages of nuclear weapons possession as existing in the same "region of initiation".

We find two kinds of states in this zone. The first are technologically advanced states that have chosen to proliferate. It is a temporary phenomenon; the only element placing the state in the region of initiation is time. In other words, they are just beginning to construct their nuclear force structure. It is assumed that the state can move quickly toward possessing more significant arsenals.

The other kind of state is, again using the parameter of time, trapped in this zone. They can be relatively permanent mini-arsenal states, with permanence referring to a period of time that may extend for several years, or even decades. In the vast majority of literature to date, however, nuclear forces are typically presented as either in existence or not in existence. This tendency is seen in the assumptions made in descriptive case studies as well as in the coding used in quantitative analyses. A widespread assumption has been that any nuclear strength automatically places potential costs above any potential benefits for a 'rational' decision-maker. Many states are not nuclear-capable as a matter of choice, rather than a result of economic or technical poverty.

A majority of these states claim to be inhibited by the international norm against nuclear proliferation established, in large part, by the components and efforts of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime. In this scenario, nuclear deterrence cannot be established in a manner that can guarantee nuclear-free crises. It may be in recognition of this possibility that some scholars are intrigued by the "more is better" argument, a hallmark of Waltz. What if a state possesses, for example, a mini-arsenal, and therefore cannot ensure a level of destruction that sufficiently threatens an adversary? What if the ultimate cost to the opposing decision-maker is personal power rather than casualties?

In this case, the assumption that any level of nuclear attack is sufficient to deter, even of the kind Japan suffered in , might be dangerously inaccurate. Decision-Theoretic Deterrence Theorists accept the conclusions drawn by Structural Deterrence and build on them to provide an analysis of decision behavior. In other words, they begin with the assumption that any nuclear war is too costly to be fought. Concepts derived from this school include "critical risk", or the maximum point of acceptable punishment before a decision-maker is deterred.

Tactics based on this opinion can easily be translated into a state's functioning policy. These could include convincing your adversary that you are incapable of making concessions, 56 feigning irrationality, 57 or Kahn's dramatic metaphor of ripping the steering wheel from the car while engaged in a game of Chicken. In this case, a potential opponent tries to determine the adversary's level of pain sufficient to deter by calculating the value of what is threatened. This is an important distinction in cases below MAD. Contrary to universal deterrence, purported to function when all states make nuclear threats in order to create systemic stability, specific losses are predicted, such as population, domestic political support of high leadership, long-term effects on the economy, and so forth.

Would the relatively moderate Khatami regime of Iran back down more readily to threats made to civilian centers? Most important, how would these dynamics affect a stance of nuclear deterrence, and how does Classical Deterrence Theory help discern these nuances? The tendency has been to label them as 'irrational' or 'crazy'. Yet, repeatedly in history, we have seen actors make conscious decisions and take steps that have resulted in extreme suffering. According to Thucydides, the Melians refused to join the Athenian alliance, fully aware that their men would be slaughtered and boys castrated to join their women in a life of slavery. Was this account simply a parable to stress the moral dimension of power in international relations, or a chapter of history akin to Masada that would, and still can, repeat itself?

Let us also consider a more Machiavellian leadership, such as a Saddam Hussein that would commit heinous acts against his own Kurdish population or submit his population to debilitating sanctions while maintaining a palatial lifestyle for himself? To assume that any level of nuclear possession automatically will preclude nuclear use is foolhardy, particularly when a state is basing its security policies on this assumption. Automatically equating nuclear risk-taking with irrational decision-making is not possible at all levels of nuclear capability. It is of the highest relevance to recognize that policy considerations geared toward preventing nuclear use could omit potential solutions. The likelihood of additional horizontal and vertical proliferation based on a 'balance of terror' can even increase.

Scholars who support this path are in the minority, yet alternatives have yet to be based upon a solid foundation of deterrence theory. The fact that nuclear deterrence theory was developed in one kind of world does not mean that it cannot be instructive in others, if properly applied. By considering a state's level of nuclear capability as an independent variable with multiple variations, the causal effects on crisis behavior can be more accurately assessed and tested. In this manner, other policies, such as those that promote confidence building measures or other kinds of security assurances, can be identified and put forward with increased confidence.

This is followed by a potential, and more discerning, coding of nuclear capability with a sample application. The lessons from that period of super-arsenal contest continue to influence policy toward other states. Today, however, targets include states below super-arsenal capability, including the quasi-nuclear states of Iran and Iraq. Therefore, there may be considerable misdirected efforts that may not only fail to meet the objective of removing nuclear use as a crisis option, but actually increasing the likelihood.

Iraq's nuclear progress has been well known since the aftermath of Desert Storm. Its nuclear proliferation program has been severely hindered, but much of the human talent remains, and possibility significant material components of the proliferation attempt that have not been discovered by inspectors. If allowed, Iraq may quickly proliferate once sanctions are lifted. While Iran denies any attempt to acquire a nuclear force structure, evidence points to the contrary. IAEA inspections are conducted on a regular basis, but these only take place at declared sites with declared nuclear materials. Iran is energy-rich.

Iranian nuclear-related acquisitions also are suspect. The evidence indicates that Iran's true intent is to gain the ability to build its own nuclear warheads. Protracted conflict, or "hostile interactions which extend over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of open warfare fluctuating in frequency and intensity", 69 can be based on a number of factors. Protracted conflicts are not unique to the Middle East, 70 yet due to a variety of ingredients, such as geographical proximity and border disputes, there have been many sparks over time. Therefore, there are multiple pre-war crises to study, as well as intra-war crises, between Iran and Iraq. There also is a demographic, or ethnic, ingredient. Contrary to many ethnic-based conflicts in which the two sides can be defined and separated, the antagonism in this case is caused by a heterogeneous Iraqi society and cross-border affinities with Iran.

Iraq, on the other hand, has a much more diverse population. The majority of the remaining Sunnis are Kurds, who have been persecuted by Hussein's government. With strong cross-border religious ties, Baghdad often perceives Iran as a challenge for the loyalty of many Iraqis. Both Iran and Iraq, even if they gain the ability to build or buy a nuclear weapons capability, would be likely to remain at the level of a mini-arsenal for a duration of time that could experience multiple crises.

Since mini-arsenals may not be able to guarantee nuclear escalation to unacceptable levels, they may appear to be a viable military or political option, a potential weakness to a deterrent stance. This is particularly true if an emphasis on military advantage overcomes a fear of physical damage. Prior to the s, the US sought to control Iran and Iraq by encouraging a regional balance of power. Assisting one state, and then the other, this process came to halt with the Iranian Revolution and failure of the United States to achieve an open dialogue with the new government. Since that time, a series of laws have been passed in an attempt to continue exerting influence in the region. The Clinton Administration began by following a policy of 'dual containment', 72 hoping to strangle any nuclear weapons program until governments friendly, or at least malleable to the US, came to power.

Relations with Iran have warmed a bit, but the US still believes that Teheran covets nuclear weapons, as well as long-range missiles. Proof of this is 'counterproliferation', a policy that recognizes proliferation can occur and seeks to provide protection from nuclear-armed adversaries. In sum, two states within a protracted conflict wish to acquire nuclear force structures but are inhibited, and therefore restricted, to a mini-arsenal potential. The policies geared toward preventing nuclear use in the Northern Tier do not address underlying motivations to acquire the bomb.

Instead, they are maintaining a situation in which proliferation, however difficult, can occur. Classical Deterrence Theory, when considering rational actors at various levels of nuclear capability, may indicate that a nuclear-capable Iran and Iraq within a crisis may choose to use their nuclear weapons and risk retaliation. The next section provides one example of a game-theoretic approach to investigate potential nuclear use. If this tendency is detected, more effective policies need to be recommended than those based on traditional, Cold War nuclear deterrence.

Theory of Moves and Nuclear Arsenal Games While it has been assumed that nuclear dynamics between smaller powers will manifest the same underlying assumptions, theory and research rather than faith would seem more appropriate as a basis for beliefs when the consequences of error may be serious. Consider the recent example of the shock among policy community analysts over Indian and Pakistani nuclear testing. Or did nuclear deterrence, a la the Cold War, become more robust and therefore offer the promise of greater crisis stability?

Standard approaches based on the experiences of the superpowers with super-arsenals are unlikely to generate useful theory and policy for a rapidly changing situation that involves other kinds of arsenals. The model provides the foundation for development of a multi-purpose data set. In this piece, the data, and the taxonomy and typologies derived from it, will be used to generate propositions based on the Nuclear Arsenal Games NAG , adapted from the Theory of Moves , or TOM, a game-theoretic model. Instead, TOM, is ideal for demonstrating the importance of creating a data base that indicates various types of WMD capabilities and related potential preferences.

Emulating this, the NAG intends to offer understanding and prediction to more than the minority of academics with advanced training in specialized game theory. In addition, the data set created for use in assessing propositions generated by the NAG is compatible with diverse methodological applications, from descriptive case studies to advanced quantitative analysis. TOM addresses the following questions about crisis interactions: Under what conditions will players move in a specified order? When a player moves, what is its optimal strategy i. When players think ahead more than one step, would they act differently say, by moving from a Nash equilibrium, or a state from which no player would have an incentive to depart unilaterally because its departure would immediately lead to a worse, or at least not better, state?

The ability to answer the questions above in the context of a game between nuclear arsenal states under crisis conditions sums up the basic theoretical significance of this study. With respect to policy, this study goes beyond the bulk of prior analysis by discarding the implicit assumption that the logic of superpower rivalry and super-arsenals will be present in other nuclear-capable dyads as well. Results from analysis of the NAG in the crisis setting should provide insights into policy that would not be available from a strictly superpower-oriented frame of reference.

The game is dynamic because the players start with a past, which determines the state where play begins. Recall that mutual cooperation does not infer peace or the absence of a crisis. To date, Japan is not considered as a potential nuclear proliferator. Players then compare this situation with future states they and other players can create by moving one or more times. As they look ahead at their possible moves, the possible countermoves of other players, their own counter-countermoves, and so on, the players try to anticipate where a game will terminate, which is where they are assumed to obtain the best feasible payoffs. Figure 2 shows the generic version of a 2x2 game. Each player has two strategies, s 1 and s 2 for Row, and t 1 and t 2 for Column.

The alternative strategies are defined simply as non-use, or "Cooperate" s 1 and t 1 , and use, or "Defect" s 2 and t 2 of the nuclear arsenal. The payoffs resulting from the outcomes are generated by each combination of strategies appear respectively for Row and Column in each cell of the matrix. The players in TOM begin at an initial state that reflects a previous outcome or point in time. Either player can begin the game by switching their strategy. Alternating responses continue until the player whose turn it is to move next chooses not to switch its strategy.

When this happens the game ends, reaching its final state. At the theoretical level, the point of departure for this analysis is an objection to the assumption that all nuclear rivalries, when manifested in crisis interactions, necessarily follow this logic.

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